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Here is a health policy riddle: despite the fact that we are not always clear as to what we are trying to achieve, even on the most basic level, we must make policy anyway. 
Odder still: this is as we might expect it to be, and perhaps 
even as it should be. After all, part of what makes health policy 
important is precisely the fact that it raises critical questions 
about our most basic human values and social commitments. 
The conversation should be fluid. Norman Daniels has long 
been an important participant in these conversations. Just 
Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly—a titular play on his 1985 
book, Just Health Care (1)—is Daniels’s attempt to wrestle with 
contemporary challenges that have forced him to rethink his 
positions. At its most basic level, then, Just Health can be read as 
a reminder of the tentativeness of scholarly positions on the core 
questions of health as well as the importance of being willing to 
revise both the questions we ask and the positions we take.
In Just Health care, Daniels identified six important areas of 
concern: 1. Adequate nutrition, 2. Sanitary, safe, unpolluted 
living and working conditions, 3. Exercise, rest, and such 
important lifestyle features as avoiding substance abuse and 
practicing safe sex, 4. Preventive, curative, rehabilitative, 
and compensatory personal medical services (and devices), 
and 5. Nonmedical personal and social support services 
(pp. 42–3). Just Health adds a sixth critical component: other 
social determinants of health. To get to this level, Daniels uses 
early chapters to establish the “special moral importance of 
health” as an object of inquiry (Chapter 2), and to look beyond 
healthcare to a more-inclusive and socially-expansive view of 
health (Chapter 3). As Daniels notes, “bioethics has not looked 
‘upstream’ from the point of delivery of medical services to the 
role of the healthcare system in improving population health.” 
As a result, it tends to miss “the distribution of social goods that 
determine the health of societies”. The point is clear since—in 
the 21st century—health can no longer be served a la carte; we 
must think systemically. Hence Daniels’s larger point is that 
“social justice in general is good for population health and its 
fair distribution” (p. 82).
As he did in previous work, Daniels wants to understand how 
John Rawls’s arguments about justice can address inequalities in 
social determinants of health. To justify this focus, he takes on 
criticisms of the Rawlsian project from communitarians (G.A. 
Cohen, especially) and capabilities theorists (such as Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum). Daniels ultimately rejects both 
approaches, opting instead to synthesize the Rawlsian concern 
with opportunity with health policy outcomes. One challenge of 
working with these thinkers, however, is that health is not their 
central concern. To this end, it would be interesting to know 
how Daniels would have handled more recent scholarship such 
as Sridhar Venkatapuram’s Health Justice (2), which extends 
Sen and Nussbaum’s work specifically and at length to the 
domain of health (3). In particular, Venkatapuram’s work might 
help Daniels address one of the key objections he raises to the 
capabilities approach, namely that it does not offer a “clear idea 
of what restrictions are compatible with the overall demands 
of justice” (p. 68). After all, as Daniels notes, “Despite the 
difference in terminology—capabilities versus opportunity—
the two views largely converge” (p. 70).
One way Daniels envisions using the Rawlsian framework in 
the pursuit of just health is to include healthcare institutions 
among Rawls’s notion of “basic institutions”. As Daniels argues, 
“Because meeting healthcare needs has an important effect 
on the distribution of opportunity, the healthcare institutions 
should be regulated by a fair equality of opportunity principle. 
Once we note the connection of normal functioning to the 
opportunity range, this strategy seems the natural way to 
extend Rawls’s view” (p. 57). But, since we do not always agree 
on the aims of health itself, Daniels’ response to the absence 
of consensus amounts to a procedural turn: “If we have no 
consensus on principles capable of resolving disputes about 
resource allocation for health and healthcare, then we must 
find a fair process whose outcomes we can accept as just or 
fair” (p. 109). Daniels rejects simple turns to markets, majority 
rule, cost-effectiveness analysis and appeals to empirical claims, 
preferring instead a sustained commitment to four conditions: 
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publicity, relevance, revisability, and enforceability. Each of 
these conditions, says Daniels, would not replace the democratic 
processes that, “ultimately…have authority and responsibility 
for guaranteeing the fairness of limit-setting decisions” (p. 138). 
Instead, they would complement and fortify them.
Part II of Just Health lays out some of challenges of obtaining 
health objectives in light of Daniels’s concern with the 
maximization of opportunity. Here Daniels highlights issues 
concerning global aging and intergenerational equity as societies 
age and put pressure on institutions competing for supposedly 
scarce medical resources (Chapter 6). Here we wade into the 
controversial waters of healthcare rationing and meeting needs 
resulting from ever-increasing chronic health problems. Daniels 
takes on workplace risk and health protection (Chapter 7) by 
emphasizing the importance of reducing workers’ exposure to 
workplace health hazards. Building on earlier considerations of 
the special moral value of health, Daniels asks (in Chapter 8) what 
special professional obligations we should ascribe to medical 
professionals. This chapter should be required reading, not 
only for medical professionals, but medical students and those 
considering medical school,  as it situates the vocation of the 
medical professional in the particular contexts of contemporary 
health challenges rather than leaning on supposedly timeless 
Hippocratic platitudes. Of particular note is Daniels’ 
considerations of medical professionals’ bioethical obligations 
in the face of risk, which are particularly contentious for those 
preoccupied—justifiably or not—with medical malpractice. 
Perhaps most critical on this score is Daniels’s insistence that 
we address tensions in physicians’ financial interests and 
patients’ health interests. Among the most important insights 
Daniels makes here is the recognition that the physician is not 
a static entity, but must adapt to changing health challenges and 
environments to meet the demands of justice. Unfortunately, 
as Daniels notes, justice has only rarely served as the medical 
profession’s north star.
In the last part of the book, “Uses”, Daniels examines some 
practical considerations of his approach to a just approach 
to health. It is here that he begins to lay out the specific tasks 
of health reform since, as he notes, “The theory of justice 
and health developed in this book should help guide our 
understanding in practical ways about the just design of health 
systems” (p. 243). Daniels revisits what he (with Donald Light 
and Ronald Caplan) called “Benchmarks of Fairness”, (4) which 
“translate central ideas about justice and health into an evidence-
based approach to improving health policy” while affording an 
opportunity to “assess the adequacy of the theory” itself. Each 
of the benchmarks—equity, accountability, and efficiency—
needs to be developed in culturally-specific and ethical ways. 
Appropriately, therefore, Daniels turns in the final chapters 
to implications for health objectives in developing countries. 
Here he places practical considerations—the siting of treatment 
facilities, processes for fair coverage decision-making—within 
the broader framework of opportunity-based justice. The level 
of detail, and Daniels knowledge of the cases he addresses, in 
Malawi, Mexico, and beyond, is stunning.
On the larger scale, Daniels sees great possibility in using 
human rights frameworks to promote global health. Daniels’s 
goal is to “build…on the practical strengths of the human rights 
movement by addressing and trying to eliminate…one of its 
important blind spots: the problem of priority setting in the face 
of the unsolved rationing problems….” (p. 314). He also casts 
ethically-problematic global dynamics such as the migration of 
physicians from developing to developed countries (so-called 
“brain drain”) as questions of justice and floats proposals—
however tentative they may be—for addressing problems 
with international drug patents that make critical medications 
cost-prohibitive. On each of these scores Daniels places more 
hope in international organizations—“where the action is” 
(p. 354)—than states. Only these organizations, he says, can 
get ahead of the curve and “move beyond a minimalist strategy 
that justifies only avoiding and correcting harms” (p. 354). 
In taking this approach, Daniels gives theoretical support to 
some of the most important health policy trends, which now 
increasingly recognize that healthcare itself often arrives on the 
scene too late to do much good. Instead, a just approach toward 
global health requires preemptive action by way of wellness 
programs, screenings, environmental health, the reduction of 
inequality, and a dizzying large but nonetheless important set 
of interventions into the way we live, the distribution of power 
between states, political economy, and beyond. This is a tall 
order. But it is the right order that we can ill afford to avoid 
making. As Daniels would be the first to admit, his book is just 
a beginning.
Daniels covers too much intellectual terrain to do justice to 
in this space. It must suffice to focus on Just Health’s larger 
contribution of addressing pervasive and constantly-morphing 
health inequities. As is often the case with philosophy, policy-
makers may find themselves exasperated at the divide between 
the philosophical underpinnings of health work and the sausage 
machine nature of policy-making. Yet, these are precisely the 
kind of questions that can prepare health policy to address 
increasingly technologized, complicated, and far-reaching 21st 
century health challenges. The move from Just Healthcare to 
Just Health marks the most important of these moves by taking 
seriously the social determinants of health. But the scope of this 
concern is daunting, and requires expanding the boundaries 
of more traditional scholarly work in health. Our most basic 
understanding of the aims of health policy will also continue 
to be challenged as our ability to address health needs expands. 
As life expectancies rise at disproportionate levels, in ways that 
are highly correlated with class, race, and gender, our most 
well-known frameworks for assessing justice will continue 
to be challenged. A key question for Daniels, then, and those 
readers that Just Health will inspire, is how to get policy-makers 
to spend time with and take seriously philosophical debates, 
just as we need philosophers writing in Daniels’ wake to come 
out of their Platonic caves and dirty their hands with policy. As 
Daniels shows, this is precisely what the move from healthcare 
to health requires. 
Despite Daniels’s concern with practical applications, however, 
the question of the relationship between philosophy and 
politics remains. Daniels notes, for example, “Our deliberations 
about options should be informed by the best evidence and 
arguments...” (p. 312). But evidence and arguments are hardly 
enough in these times. As a philosopher who cares deeply about 
health, Daniels seems to place hope in the possibility that we 
might draw the correct lines to understand which modes of 
care deserve the mobilization of social resources and which 
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modes do not. While this approach seems intuitively correct, I 
am not so sanguine. A political reading of the question reminds 
us that social policy rarely operates in such a world and I fear 
that Daniels’s text does not quite steel readers enough for 
the ugly and sometimes surprising fights that will need to be 
waged. Nonetheless, Just Health breathes new life into the most 
essential debates underpinning health policy and helps us set 
the philosophical bearings that are needed for efficacious and 
ethical policy work. 
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